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Abstract:  
Despite Karl Marx’s overwhelming focus on economics and politics – culminating in 
Capital: Critique of Political Economy – his philosophy has inspired an array of 
Marxist or Marxian theories regarding the arts. Yet, the key tenet of these theories has 
not been Marx’s radical emphasis on the foundational role of production in human 
subjectivity. Marxist theories of art have, generally speaking, either examined the arts’ 
capacity for signifying social relations and class struggle – as seen in many a 
Marxists’ penchant for realism – or they have seen the arts as little more than 
aesthetic legitimations of ruling class ideology, a view which, in its most positive 
manifestation, can be found in the experimental and modernist tendency to 
undermine the morals and mores of the bourgeoisie by committed artists. Neither of 
these approaches, at any rate, sees art as a form and outcome of production in itself. 
In this article, I wish to present a Marxian theory of art, based on Marx’s entire oeuvre, 
from his earliest journalistic writings to Capital, which presents art as neither an 
aesthetic mimesis nor an ideological alibi of production. I would like to propose that 
for Marx art was, first and foremost, a use-value produced by concrete human 
labour.  
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Art – What Is It Good For? 
 
In what must be one of the more convoluted policy statements spouted by a 
contemporary government officialdom, the United Kingdom’s national body for 
funding and promoting the arts in England, Arts Council England, declares on its 
website: 
 
The value of arts and culture to people and society outlines the existing 
evidence on the contemporary impact of arts and culture on our economy, 
health and wellbeing, society and education.1 
  
It would require a good degree of fortitude and perseverance to untangle the 
meaning of this brazenly overwritten sentence. Note, for instance, the sheer opacity 
of the verb “outline” in denoting the nature or substance of the relationship between 
“the value of arts” and “impact of arts”. This and other linguistic oddities of the 
statement – such as the tautological formulation of saying that something in society 
outlines something in, yes, society – indicate that this sentence, as with other policy 
and politician-spoken statements of our era, is an exemplar in the craft of 
constructing elaborate verbal utterances without saying much at all.  
However, if an unambiguous communication of its authors’ understanding of 
the value of art is not one of the functions of this statement – an understanding 
which, at any rate, may be lacking in the first place – the combination of important-
sounding nouns (“people,” “society,” “health,” and “education”) does convey the 
authors’ general belief in the significance of art. The meaning of saying that the value 
of something outlines the evidence on the impact of that thing is utterly mysterious to 
me; but the desire of the speakers of this utterance to be seen to have something 
publicly and socially important to say on the topic is not so opaque. All modern 
democratic governments – and anti- or pre-modern autocrats too, for that matter – 
often wish to be seen to care about the value of art, even if articulating the reasons 
behind this desire is an insurmountable challenge for them, or at least for the English 
government. 
The purpose of this essay is not to mock politicians’ – or, most probably, a 
poorly-paid and overworked lower arts administrator’s – ineptitude with written 
language. Indeed, semantic ambiguity and incomprehensibility may be a 
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requirement of the genre of contemporary political communication, freeing the 
speaker from a difficult – and assessable – commitment to the message or promise 
of the statements made. At any rate, I do not wish to dwell any further on Art Council 
England’s inability or unwillingness to articulate a view apropos of the question of the 
value of the arts. What I instead wish to focus on is the challenge of formulating a 
perspective regarding the value of art beyond alluding to a vague belief in the 
general “impact” of art on society and on societal motifs such as “health” and 
“education.” 
And, importantly, this challenge is not at all unique to politicians and their 
copywriters. In the preface to a series of essays on the theme of artistic value 
published in Arts21 Magazine, the author has described both “the relationship 
between art and money, and … the value of art in our individual lives” as “deeply 
complicated.”2 In an opinion piece published in The Sydney Morning Herald, the 
author Toni Hassan chides the Australian politicians whose laudable 
acknowledgment of the value of the arts – as seen in public statements uncannily 
similar to those of Arts Council England – have “spruiked the economic benefits of 
the arts but said little about the delivery costs.”3 Even a scholar of marketing and 
economics – who should, one would assume, be rather au fait at measuring the 
value and costs of things – such as Kim Lehman of Tasmanian School of Business 
and Economics isn’t quite sure how to address this dilemma.4  After distinguishing 
between the instrumental and intrinsic values or benefits of art, Lehman confuses the 
two terms by saying that both types of value must have discernible economic 
expressions if they are to be measurable and understandable. He claims that an 
example of the instrumental value of art may be seen in a public visual arts project 
which, in “an economically depressed region” could result in “increasing local 
employment;” but his example of the intrinsic value of art is also economic – he cites 
an instance of the evaluation of intrinsic value in performing arts companies’ desire 
to gauge audience satisfaction because the companies’ “revenue streams rely on a 
paying audience, and indeed one that returns for future performances.” One may 
forgive Lehman’s preoccupation with all things financial as an aspect of his research 
expertise, but his inability to truly differentiate between an instrumental and an 
intrinsic value of art – reducing both to the milieu of finance, capital and consumption 
– results in him failing to provide an answer to the question of art’s value. He ends his 
piece by wondering if the true value of art can at all be discussed – by asking 
rhetorically, “How do you measure intellectual stimulation? Emotional engagement?” 
– before concluding that perhaps “the arts will continue to be valued more for its role 
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as a driver of economic development than as a cure for the soul – or, worse still, not 
valued at all.” 
I must admit, from the outset, that the purpose of my own essay is not to 
propose a scientific method for measuring the value of art. Such a quixotic task 
would require that I assign to art only an instrumental value, something that, as 
mentioned above, even a finance-driven economist is not prepared to do. Nor do I 
wish to make a case for art as simply “a cure for the soul,” despite the fact that I 
would like to think of myself as a rather soulful practicing artist, and that, as I will 
discuss later, I have no issue with acknowledging catharsis as one of the uses of art. 
What I instead wish to do is to approach the question of the value of art – and, 
indeed, the question of the very definition, nature and capacity of art, or a philosophy 
of art – from a perspective occasioned by the 150th anniversary of the publication of 
Karl Marx’s Capital, Volume I. 
 Marx, perhaps the most famous and also most infamous theorist of value and 
production, has been abundantly praised and criticised for his theories regarding 
both the material or economic and the ideological or mental dimensions of our 
modern capitalist world. But can he also provide us with a theory of art, one which 
may help us better understand, reframe and, perhaps even – after Marx’s own 
revolutionary ideals – transform the question of the value of art?  
There is, of course, nothing new in considering art from a Marxian or Marxist 
perspective. As we shall see, despite his frankly undeserved reputation as an 
uncompromising economic determinist, Marx’s philosophy is heavily conversant with 
the question of art, even if the philosopher did not produce a sustained, stand-alone 
study of the artistic phenomenon. His views on art – as scattered across his many 
writings and publications, and as ascertained by Marxist scholars after his own life – 
have resulted in entire schools of artistic theorisation, such as the Marxist literary 
theory associated with the likes of Pierre Macherey and Terry Eagleton. It is my view, 
however, that a fresh consideration of Marx’s own published writings, from his 
earliest editorials in the newspaper Rheinische Zeitung to the intricate theorising of 
Capital, can provide us with a theory of art which is capable of both addressing the 
question of artistic value as well as offering a powerful and radical philosophy of art, 
one which does not exhibit what I see as the aporia of the existing Marxist theories of 
art.   
In what I may describe, however simplistically, as a realist Marxist theory of art, 
one may find – in the work of theorists such as György Lukács – art seen as a 
medium capable of representing an external truth (e.g. the conditions of work in the 
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modern society) but lacking its own truthfulness. Or, put differently, it can be said that 
such a conception of art reduces art to the status of representing – but not itself 
being – social reality. On the other hand, the type of Marxist literary or artistic theory 
primarily concerned with the non-material or the ideological – which, as noted 
previously, can be seen in the work of Macherey and Eagleton – depicts art as an 
actual participant in the reality of ideology; and yet such a depiction can result in art 
becoming almost irreversibly detached from the milieu of material artistic production 
and aesthetic labour. Put differently, the view of art as something made up of ideas 
and attitudes towards ideology does not necessarily help with understanding the 
processes involved in the creation of art and the values that may be immanent to 
such acts of creation. 
I believe, in short, that the dominant Marxian approaches to the question of art 
have either reduced art to a secondary mimetic role vis-à-vis the socio-economic, or 
they have extracted and divorced art from the socio-economic world of labour and 
production. To put things somewhat reductively, according to both these 
approaches art has little more than instrumental value. But I believe that Marx’s own 
views on art, irrespective of his influential future interlocutors’ interventions, proposes 
a far more sophisticated and startling theory of art. I would like to argue that Marx’s 
theory of production, and his view of the indispensable centrality of use-value 
production in labour, provides us with a theory of artistic value which neither assigns 
to the work of art an entirely metaphysical, undefinable intrinsic value, nor reduces 
the work to a monetised exchange-value. What I aim to outline in this essay is the 
contour of an understanding of the work of art as, indeed, the work of producing 
intrinsic use-value through work and concrete, definable human labour.      
 
Art and Value before Marx 
 
I would like to begin by sketching an outline of some of the key theories of art and of 
artistic value prior to Marx. This will, I hope, help with both grounding Marx’s 
approach and discoveries in the works of philosophers which directly influenced him 
– Marx’s fellow-German near contemporary G. W. F. Hegel, most notably – and also 
set the parameters of the specific discussion in the terms proposed by the tradition of 
Western philosophy, which, despite Marx’s non-philosophical political and economic 
commitments and interests, is arguably the first and foremost context for the 
manifestation of his own ideas.  
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 Whilst so much of the discussions of the value of art in our contemporary late 
capitalist world is almost entirely focused on the monetary instrumental value of art – 
either to do with funding for the arts, artists pay, or art as either investment or as 
commodity – in much of the canon of Western philosophy the dominant discussions 
of art have been premised upon the recognition, either appreciative or critical, of the 
intrinsic and hence non-instrumental value or qualities of art. This is not to say that 
Western thinkers have all viewed art as intrinsically useful in the common 
understanding of the word – that is, as something with ostensibly beneficial qualia – 
but that their perspectives have depicted the value of art (be it a positive or a 
negative value) as a quality inherent or intrinsic to the work’s immanent 
manifestation – or its creation – and not to its socio-cultural evaluation.  
 Indeed, in what can be easily described as the first serious and perhaps most 
foundational discussion of art in Western philosophy – Book X of Plato’s Republic – 
art is presented as very much useless and also valueless precisely because it is, 
according to Plato, devoid of an instrumental value. After arguing that all art is more 
or less a genus of representation, and that all representation is quite far removed 
from reality, Plato asserts that the supreme literary creator of the ancient Hellenic 
world, Homer, would not be able to “explain medicine or any similar skilled activity to 
us” even if he is able to “imitate doctors’ talk” in his poetry.5 This allows Plato to 
advance that the poet, therefore, has no “practical skill” and can do “no public 
service.”6 To substantiate this potentially scandalous view of a much-loved poet, Plato 
argues that the key reason for the artist’s inability to perform an ostensibly beneficial 
task in the society is that, in representing objects such as the horse’s bit and bridle or 
a human subject such as the harness-maker, the artist displays, in addition to an 
ignorance apropos of the practical skill required for making the bit and bridle, no 
knowledge of how to use the represented objects because “only a horseman […] 
knows how to use them.”7 This brings Plato to conclude, apropos of this part of his 
observation on the arts, that “the artist knows little or nothing about the subjects he 
represents and that his art is something that has no serious value.”8 
 Before trying to unravel what Plato means by serious value – something that I 
believe is actually quite different to an instrumental value – let us note that he has 
limited his conception of use to the sphere of professional practice and that he does 
not see it connected, as Marx will later discover, to the sphere of general human 
needs. The bridle or the flute (one of Plato’s other famous examples) are only useful 
to the horseman and to the flutist, and it is therefore only these ascribed users who 
can truly know the value of the object, not the artists who paint pictures or write 
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poems about bridled horses and flutes and also, interestingly, nor the producers of 
the bridle and the flute, the harness-maker or the flute-maker. In other words, for 
Plato, use is very much conflated with consumption and also with an instrumental 
social benefit. The supposed resulting uselessness of art, however, is not Plato’s 
major concern with art. Later in Book X of the Republic, he argues that art, whilst 
benefit-less and useless, is not entirely ineffective, for it appeals to an “inferior” 
dimension of the human subject which the philosopher would “call irrational and lazy 
and cowardly.”9 This claim leads to Plato’s “gravest charge against poetry,” his 
accusing poetry – and, by extension, all art – of having “a terrible power to corrupt 
even the best characters” as it draws us (the consumers or, in Plato’s sense, users of 
poetry and art) into a vortex of sinister, excessive emotionality – “the poet gratifies 
and indulges the natural instinct to give full vent to our sorrows” and diverts us from 
“the interests of our own welfare and happiness.”10     
 What are we to make of the terrible power of art if we are to also acknowledge 
its uselessness and valuelessness? Can’t such a power be seen as a kind of value – 
in so far as both power and value denote a capacity or the means for developing a 
capacity – or can’t such a destructive power actually have its uses (against, say, an 
enemy)? Detecting the creeping emergence of a contradiction in his polemic against 
art, Plato ends this discourse by acknowledging somewhat begrudgingly, albeit 
unambiguously, that there are a few instances in which poetry may be seen to have 
an instrumental potential – “hymns to the gods and paeans in praise of good men”11 – 
and that he would be open to hearing poetry’s defenders argue that poetry “brings 
lasting benefits to human life and human society.”12 Plato claims, however sincerely, 
that he “shall be glad if [art and/or poetry] proves to have a real value,” although, until 
such a time as this proof has been offered – and accepted by the hard-nosed 
philosopher – he will insist that “poetry has no serious value or claim to truth.”13    
 We can now understand what Plato means by real or serious value when it 
comes to art and poetry. Instrumentally beneficial artistic products – such as religious 
songs and moral tales – may be allowed in Plato’s ideal society despite art’s 
generally and/or mostly harmful capacity, but whatever (supposedly minor and 
ephemeral) benefits are to be accrued socially from such allowance, these are not 
real or serious values. To bring lasting benefits to society, art must make a claim to 
truth instead of either representing people and things (doctors, bits and bridles, etc.) 
or indulging in overt, obsessive sentimentality and aestheticised pathology. Plato 
does not elaborate on how art may make a claim to truth, or what genus of truth 
would be considered artistic, but it seems clear that for him the real and serious 
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value of art would be an intrinsic value, because any claim to truth is entirely 
immanent to the claim itself or, in this case, to the work of art, prior to the societal 
and extrinsic instrumentalisation of the truths to which the work has claimed. Put 
differently, for Plato, art’s value – illusive, rare and perhaps impossible as it may be – 
can be established if and when art is shown to possess not power per se but the 
power to produce truths and knowledge à la science and perhaps philosophy itself.  
 Plato’s student and the next major Western philosopher to offer a significant 
theory of art and of artistic value, Aristotle, is much less interested in making a case 
for the truthfulness of art than in arguing that the very intrinsic artistic powers which 
Plato found so terrible – art’s commanding appeal to emotion as opposed to reason 
– are in fact useful. Aristotle writes, in the Poetics, that, despite Plato’s renunciation of 
supposedly valueless artistic representations, the most basic unit or technē of 
representation, imitation, is something that “comes naturally to human beings from 
childhood” and so does “the universal pleasure in imitations.”14 Interestingly, this 
pleasure is not an end in itself, but the means for us “to understand and work out”15 
the subject or the real world signified or imitated in the work of art. Art, then, can be 
said to have the use of providing us with an accessible, aesthetic medium for 
coming to terms with the world. Aristotle also, famously, proposes that art – or, more 
specifically, tragic drama – has the capacity for “effecting through pity and fear the 
purification of such emotions” in an audience;16 and that the art of poetry even 
possesses the capacity to be “more philosophical and more serious” than the work of 
a historian because the poet’s function is not to simply “say what has happened, but 
to say the kind of thing that would happen.”17   
 From a contemporary perspective, the theme of the purification of undesirable 
emotions or catharsis may be best approached via a psychoanalytic prism. But, for 
the purposes of setting the context for Marx’s interventions in the Western philosophy 
of art, I’d like to emphasise that Aristotle’s take on imitation, whatever the structure of 
its psycho-semantic function may be, grants art a psychological use and an intrinsic 
value (with an instrumental capacity) denied to it by Plato. For Aristotle, imitation is 
an inalienable aspect of the nature of our species, and participation in it has 
universalising consequences, qualities which, as we shall see, Marx will find in the 
act of production. Furthermore, for Aristotle, art has the power to counter the feelings 
of distress – which may be seen to anticipate Marx’s alienation – engendered by the 
fearsomeness of our reality. When discussing the universal pleasure of artistic 
imitation, Aristotle proposes that: “we take delight in viewing the most accurate 
possible images of objects which in themselves cause distress when we see them 
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(e.g. the shapes of the lowest species of animals [by which Aristotle most probably 
means spiders, snakes and scorpions], and corpses).”18 As such, art has the value of 
helping us overcome the terror and abjection aroused by what seems absolutely 
alien to us, and it can be valued for its capacity to produce delight in place of fear in 
the human subject.  
 The final philosopher whose theory of art I’d like to briefly note prior to 
exploring Marx’s thoughts on art, is a thinker who responded to Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
foundational theories of art and who also directly influenced Marx’s philosophy. In his 
Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel considers and finds insufficient both the 
Platonic view – which, by presenting art as a “the purely formal imitation of what we 
find given […] can bring to the birth only tricks and not works of art”19 – and also the 
Aristotelian defence of imitation, because “the doctrine of the purification of passion 
suffers indeed under the same defect”20 as the Platonic position: in both cases “the 
purpose of art” has been “limited” to that of “utility” – or that of a pure instrument – 
and “its conception is rooted in something else, to which it is a means.”21 Hegel’s own 
project consists of a theory of artistic value which views art as an end in itself, and I 
believe, his most important contribution in this regard is to propose that art 
possesses a genuinely intrinsic value. Hegel, in other words, proposes that art has a 
real and serious value vis-à-vis Plato’s injunction. And, also importantly, Hegel argues 
that art satisfies human needs. Such needs are, for Hegel, “the higher needs”22 and 
their satisfaction in a work of art produces “spiritual value.”23  
 It is important not to conflate Hegel’s view of art as a capacity for producing 
spiritual value with Plato’s (minimal) interest in religious cultural products such as 
religious hymns. For Hegel, even an explicitly spiritual art should not be seen to “have 
value as a useful instrument in the realisation of an end having substantive 
importance outside the sphere of art,”24 such as moral or religious education. Art 
should instead be seen to have “the vocation of revealing the truth in the form of 
sensuous artistic shape” and “having its purpose in itself.”25 So, unlike Aristotle but in 
agreement with Plato, Hegel sees truth as a key criterion to which art may aspire. 
However, unlike Plato, he does not see the relationship between art and truth as the 
making of a claim but as a revelation; suggesting that truth for Hegel is a pre-existing 
generality – the truth – and not a singularity to which every specific work of art has to 
make a fresh claim. Also importantly, he emphatically does not see art’s crucial 
capacity for the satisfaction of spiritual needs as a use, but as a vocation. I find it a 
little difficult to quite understand what Hegel means by this term, and one may have 
to resort to properly metaphysical themes – destiny, calling, etc. – to distinguish a 
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vocation from a profession or from what Hegel derides, earlier in his celebrated 
lecture, as mere “formal activity in accordance with given determinations.”26 As such, 
one can easily anticipate the materialist (and strongly atheist) Marx’s misgivings 
about Hegel’s description of art, despite the very well-known influence that the older 
German thinker exerted on a young Marx. But it is important to emphasise that, 
despite Hegel’s unwillingness to see usefulness as anything other than 
instrumentality, and his determination to see art as having almost a purely 
transcendent orientation, his connection of art’s value with the satisfaction of human 
needs, and his emphasis on the intrinsic value of art, are key to understanding Marx’s 
own approach to both art and, more generally, to the questions of labour and 
production.  
  
The Intrinsic Freedom of Writing 
 
Karl Marx was as much an heir to the philosophical traditions of the West as he was 
a heretic apropos of these very traditions. His views of art are both expressed in the 
terms proposed by earlier philosophers – in Hegelian dialectics, most notably, but 
also in the Aristotelian defence of the naturalness of art – and are also deeply at odds 
with the intentions, provenances and consequences of these terms. In keeping with 
the well-known – albeit, in some ways, problematic – naming of Marx’s philosophy as 
dialectical materialism, one could say that Marx’s theory of art reconciles a Hegelian 
dialectical view of art (art as an object with inherent, non-social value) with his own 
potent take on materialism, a materialism not merely of atheism and scientific rigour, 
but one premised on the recognition of the foundational role of labour and 
production in all human phenomenon.  
 This approach to art is, to my mind, one of the most challenging but rewarding 
theories of art as yet proposed by a philosopher. It is challenging because it breaks 
both with our contemporary capitalist, instrumentalist views of art – that is, our view 
of art as, first and foremost, either a commercial or ideological value – and also with 
our Romantic, metaphysical notions of art which present the work as a quasi-
mystical spiritual negation of the materiality of human life. According to my reading 
of Marx, art can be seen as the condition which possesses both the power for 
producing capacities or uses that are not reducible to the money-form, and it is also, 
at the same time, the product of the labour of real people – and definitely not the 
result of inspiration courtesy of abstract spirits, muses, cryptic unconscious urges, 
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and the like – working in societies dominated, but never entirely possessed, by the 
social relations and ideologies.  
 The genius of Marx – if I may use the term without allusions to the cults of 
aestheticism or Romanticism – can be seen in his ability to show that these two 
qualities are not contradictory but that they are in fact absolutely complimentary and 
even symbiotic: art’s infinite or indefinite uses exist precisely because they spring 
from material human labour which, as concrete labour – prior to its reification to 
homogenous abstract labour for the purposes of exchange and commodification – 
seeks to produce nothing other than pure usefulness, i.e. the satisfaction of 
humanity’s most basic needs. Art, therefore, is absolutely essential, useful and 
valuable, and it is also absolutely resistant to commodity fetishism and an exchange 
economy. According to my reading of Marx’s philosophy of art, he attempts the 
highly challenging but supremely radical task of showing that art has an intrinsic 
use-value, and arguing that this value, whilst not determined by the (hugely 
instrumentalising) milieu of exchange-value commodification, is still very much 
based in our drive to satisfy the very real and serious needs of our species thorough 
finite and socially situated human labour. 
 Whilst the discovery of the two-fold nature of a product’s value – the division 
between use-value and exchange-value – is something that Marx does not elucidate 
explicitly until Capital, and a full account of a theory of art as produced non-
instrumental use-value is something that will develop alongside Marx’s gradual, life-
long development as one of the most important and original thinkers of the modern 
world, his belief in (the Hegelian concept of) art as non-instrumental value, as 
present in Marx’s work from very early on, is already conversant and unsettled by the 
questions of labour, commerce and use-value. In an editorial published in 1842 in 
response to the debate about press freedom in Rheinische Zeitung – the liberal 
progressive newspaper which Marx edited until the publication’s closure by Prussian 
government censors in 1843 – Marx’s argument may at first appear very much like a 
Hegelian celebration of the value of writing as something higher than that of any 
manual metier; but it is also evident that Marx does recognise that this evaluation is 
not based on a concrete difference between the modes of mental (e.g. artistic and 
literary) as opposed to physical production, but dependent on an abstract quasi-
religious belief in the superiority of art’s intrinsic value, and hence in the categorical 
need for the maintenance of press freedom. 
 The young Marx, after having tried his hands in literary writing – having written 
poems, fiction and drama – and having failed to secure a position as a philosopher at 
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a university due to his political leanings, has been employed to edit the liberal, anti-
authoritarian publication and advance the agendas of the progressive Prussian 
intellectuals of this era. It should not surprise us then that he champions free speech, 
one of the key ideals of the highly Enlightened German Idealists. But the manner of 
Marx’s early discourse, if not its intentions, already hints at the thinker’s emerging 
understanding of both the dynamics of capitalism and the role of the writer as a 
producer or a worker, themes that are almost entirely absent from the bourgeois 
liberal discourses of Marx’s immediate social and intellectual milieu. The young 
liberal Marx is clearly a believer in the absolute generality and essentiality of freedom 
– “freedom of trade, freedom of property, of conscience, of the press, of the courts, 
are all species of the same genus, of freedom without any specific name”27 – and 
attempts to defend press freedom by showing the absurdity of the Prussian rulers’ 
penchant for, on the hand, accepting free trade and, on the other hand, suppressing 
free speech: 
 
One could also [put the question of freedom] the other way round and call 
freedom of trade merely a variety of freedom of the press. Do craftsmen work 
only with hands and legs and not with the brain as well? Is the language of 
words the only language of thought? Is not the language of the mechanic 
through the steam-engine easily perceptible to my ear, is not the language of 
the bed manufacturer very obvious to my back, that of the cook 
comprehensible to my stomach? Is it not a contradiction that all these varieties 
of freedom of the press are permitted, the sole exception being the one that 
speaks to my intellect through the medium of the printer’s ink?28 
 
Marx’s attempt to equate a writer’s freedom to do his/her job with another producer’s 
freedom to do likewise, with the aim of showing the irrationality of suppressing a 
writer’s freedom through censorship, may be seen as a mostly rhetorical and 
perhaps far-fetched device used for proving an argument; but one must not gloss 
over the deeply non-Hegelian implications of Marx’s approach. As mentioned before, 
key to Hegel’s view that art possesses, first and foremost, a spiritual value is the 
assumption that art is not formal or mechanical activity in accordance with given 
determinations. But if as Marx has shown, the engine operator, the bed-maker and 
the chef also produce aesthetico-linguist objects, then does it not follow that the 
writer too produces useful objects à la the bed-maker and the chef? If, as Marx 
would have it, manual workers do not “work only with hands and legs and […] with 
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the brain as well”, then can’t it also be said that writers and mental workers do not 
only work with the brain but use hands and legs as well? 
 Perhaps aware of the deeply anti-spiritual, anti-Idealist direction that his 
argument has taken, the young Hegelian Marx asserts, immediately after the above-
quoted passage, a belief in “the nobility of [the] nature” of journalism and the press, 
and warns against the press “degrad[ing] itself to the level of trade.”29 However, even 
here, Marx does not shy away from stating that this degradation is not the 
consequence of a high spiritual mental activity being brought down to the lower level 
of low physical production – the degradation occurs when mental activity is reduced 
to a merely commercial activity. Marx is already breaking with the commonly 
accepted teleology of commodity-value production, the dominant economic 
ideology of the same bourgeois intellectuals and progressives with whom he has 
identified thus far in his life, when he writes: “The writer, of course, must earn in order 
to be able to live and write, but he must by no means live and write to earn.”30 He 
repeats – and clearly sincerely agrees with – the Hegelian injunction against 
instrumentalisation, but he is also suspecting that the specifically Hegelian appraisal 
of the intrinsic value of art may be akin to a religious piety: 
 
The writer does not at all look on his work as a means. It is an end in itself, it is 
so little a means for him himself and others that, if need be, he sacrifices his 
existence to its existence. He is, in another way, like the preacher of religion 
who adopts the principle: “Obey God rather than man,” including under man 
himself with his human needs and desires. On the other hand, what if a tailor 
from whom I had ordered a Parisian frock-coat were to come and bring me a 
Roman toga on the ground that it was more in keeping with the eternal law of 
beauty!31 
 
 There is much that can be said about the above passage, and one can note 
the young Marx’s self-identification as a bourgeois consumer (of a Parisian frock-
coat, of all things) prior to his losing his paid job as a journalist and his move to 
France where he becomes conversant with, among other things, revolutionary 
socialism and communism and begins his pivotal life-long collaboration with the 
exceptionally insightful young labour theorist, Friedrich Engels. What is important to 
note, in the context of our discussion, is Marx’s understanding that, whilst art may 
have an intrinsic value similar to a religious vocation, it lacks an actual use only in so 
far as it can’t be ordered from a producer. The problem with the Roman toga is not 
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only that it has artistic pretentions beyond the tangible instrumental value of a 
modern coat, but that in the process of a consumer’s ordering of a product from a 
producer, the eternal law of beauty has been reified and reduced into an object with 
only an exchange-value. However, how is art supposed to resist such degradation if 
it is, unlike religion (which is, finally, the work of god) the work of men? The young 
Marx is not able to provide an answer to this question yet.  
 
Art, Speculation and Ideology 
 
I am, admittedly, reading a mature Marx’s theories of value into his earlier work, but I 
don’t at all feel that by doing so I am misrepresenting the direction and tendencies of 
his thought, since the genesis of the mature Marx’s theories are not so temporally 
removed from the younger Marx’s career. Indeed, it is almost immediately after 
leaving Rhineland, and still in a relatively early stage of his intellectual development, 
that Marx openly, and often with open hostility, rejects the Hegelian Idealism of his 
youth, and starts to propose an explicitly materialist philosophy that is absolutely 
antagonistic to bourgeois liberalism. In his first major collaborations with Engels, The 
Holy Family (1844) and The German Ideology (1845), Marx forcefully attacks many of 
the key Hegelian intellectuals, including Max Stirner, Bruno Bauer, and their disciples, 
such as a Prussian soldier called Franz Zychlin von Zychlinski who, under the 
pseudonym Szeliga, had written a rather effusive appreciation of a popular French 
novel of the period by Eugène Sue.  
Marx lambasts what he sees as the Hegelians’ untenably speculative and 
abstract – and, in short, non-materialist – understanding of art and literature, by 
noting that Szeliga’s view of the literary work depends upon a belief that the work is a 
manifestation of the theme of mystery. This perspective is not only due to the title of 
Sue’s novel – The Mysteries of Paris – but also due to the Hegelian view of art as 
spiritual revelation. As quoted by Marx in The Holy Family, a garish Parisian ballroom 
scene in the novel is interpreted by Szeliga as “the miracle of the divine presence in 
the breast of man, especially when beauty and grace uphold the conviction that we 
are in the immediate proximity of ideals.”32 Marx is quick to mock Szeliga’s rather 
fanciful reading – and calls the Hegelian an “inexperienced, credulous Critical 
country parson!”33 – but, despite the scathing tone of Marx’s attacks on his former 
fellow-Hegelians, this condemnation is not personal and is in fact based on a 
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patiently developed argument against some of the key assumption of the Hegelian 
philosophy or what Marx calls “speculative Hegelian construction.”34 
According to Marx, key elements of the Hegelian philosophy – among which 
we may include Hegel’s belief in the non-utilitarian value of art qua the satisfaction of 
a spiritual need – are based on a system of abstraction or speculation that, in trying 
to understand the world and its profane realities, commits the error of imposing an 
essential configuration over substantial corporeality. The practitioner of such a 
philosophy, having concocted a purely abstract mental image or ideal from 
encounters with the tangible components of the world – having posited “the general 
idea ‘Fruit’” for example, as “the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc.”35 – is then 
forced to move in “a speculative, mystical fashion”36 in accounting for the concrete 
and diverse actualities of the world. Such thinkers come to think that fruits “have a 
higher mystic significance, which are grown out of the ether of your brain and not out 
of the material earth.”37 And it is this systemic ignorance apropos of the material 
which marks the Hegelian literary critic Szeliga as credulous and inexperienced. 
Szeliga has imposed his own essential trope or general idea of mystery on the topics 
and aesthetics of the novel, mistaking The Mysteries of Paris for a mystical and 
altogether uplifting account of man’s moral and spiritual journey, instead of seeing it, 
as Marx does, as an account of an aristocratic protagonist’s duplicitous and self-
serving trickery and his ability or privilege to disguise himself as a commoner and, by 
so doing, gain “entry into the lower sections of society” so that he can later claim 
“how extraordinarily interesting he finds himself in the various situation.”38 
 Marx, in short, sees ruling class vanity and egoism in the discourse of a literary 
work that the high-minded, progressive Hegelians find ethical or spiritual. It would be 
tempting to see Marx’s shift of focus away from the liberal preoccupations of the 
German progressives towards socialist concerns with class as occasioned by his 
move to the radical milieu of French activism and also his growing awareness and 
study of English economic theory, and it would be as equally convenient to see 
Marx’s irreversible move in a socialist direction in mid 1840s as a consequence of the 
revolutionary zeitgeist which anticipated the 1848 European revolutions, political 
conflicts which pitted not only the bourgeois liberals against the conservative nobility, 
but also brought the bourgeoisie in direct conflict with the proletariat. However, 
Marx’s own claim would be that, irrespective of one’s political affiliations – Marx’s 
increasingly uncompromising socialism vs. the Hegelians’ increasingly 
commonplace liberalism – there is something inherently untenable, irrational and, 
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finally, ideological about the Hegelian view of art qua something that has a non-
instrumental albeit moral or spiritual value. 
 Marx’s sensational discovery of modern ideology in The German Ideology, 
which, as is well-known, could be said to mark his final epistemological break with 
Hegelian philosophy, has been too extensively written about by the recent 
proponents of Western Marxism to require explanation here. For the purposes of our 
mapping and investigation of Marx’s philosophy of art, it is important to point out that 
in The German Ideology, alongside the continuation of his philosophical 
disparagement of individual Hegelians, he and Engels are now proposing an 
alternative and economic-materialist theory of historical progress, one which 
accounts not only for why liberal bourgeois intellectuals make the laughable and 
mistaken assumptions exposed and lampooned in The Holy Family, but also strives 
to locate the material origins and social locality of the class for which these 
intellectuals speak. Marx and Engels’ seminal, dramatic identification of the modern 
upper middle-classes or the bourgeoisie as the ruling class of the modern world, and 
the shift of the target of the revolutionaries’ ire from conservative ancien régime 
nobility and clergy towards the industrial and financial bourgeoisie, is articulated 
both in a class theory, founded on an analysis of the modes and relations of physical 
and monetised production (such as manufacture, property ownership, agriculture, 
etc.) and also in a theory of the modes and relations of mental and ideological 
production which includes, among other things, what could be seen as an 
understanding of art as a feature or outcome of ruling class ideology. 
  Indeed, it would not be difficult to say that, based on a somewhat superficial 
reading of The German Ideology, Marx, who once had rather exultant things to say 
about the arts – who, as a would-be young Prussian poet, had claimed that one lives 
and earns to write and not the other way around, and that one should be ready to 
forfeit one’s existence for art – is now, as a would-be internationalist revolutionary 
who will soon be drawn to the world of real, violent anti-governmental agitation and 
political activity, has come to question the value and the usefulness of art. If, as he 
and Engels now famously claim, “the ideas of ruling class are in every epoch the 
ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same 
time its ruling intellectual force”39 then can’t it be said that artistic production, as a 
species of intellectual production, is determined or at least enlisted by ruling class 
forces, and that it has no real or serious intrinsic value for a position opposed to the 
power of the ruling class? In support of such a view – which more than brings to 
mind Plato’s injunction against the arts – we may cite Marx and Engels’ continued 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






preoccupation with the hapless Hegelians in The German Ideology. Here, they 
ridicule the “lofty moral postulate”40 of one of the chief Hegelian public intellectuals, 
Max Stirner, for whom “creative activity is […] only a paraphrase of speculative 
reflection or pure essence.”41Is creative activity as such not the problem, then, if it is so 
easily coopted in the faulty speculative, moralist enterprise of a bourgeois 
intellectual? And does Marx and Engels’s view, further on in the book, that it is the 
former aristocratic ruling classes’ “direct, naïve outlook on life which finds expression 
in memoirs, poems, novels, etc.”42, not an unambiguous dismissal of so many genres 
of literature as mere expressions of a ruling class ideology?  
 I believe that such a reading of Marx is almost entirely mistaken, and that Marx 
is not at all deriding art qua art (or art as intrinsic value) but elucidating art’s crass 
ideological instrumentalisaions, and finally denouncing the Hegelians (and perhaps 
Hegel himself) for their inability to offer a genuinely non-instrumental theory of artistic 
value. Whilst Marx by mid 1840s has come to reject the fanciful, Idealist views of art, 
he has not come to do so as a political militant suspicious of the arts and their 
potential guilt of collusion with repressive ideologies. He has instead developed, in 
concert with his attacks on liberalism and his exposition of bourgeois liberals’ 
material economic interests, a powerful theory of labour and production, and has 
come to not criticise the proponents of creative activity per se but to criticise those 
who see creative activity as a metaphysical, mystical enterprise and not as socially 
situation laboured production.   
 He and Engels dismiss as “nonsense” Stirner’s belief that one can be a born 
poet or a born musician not because Marx thinks that one cannot be a great poet – 
or that one cannot develop qualities, skills and values that could constitute the art of 
poetry from the time of birth – but because of the blatant logical inconsistency in the 
Hegelian’s argument which tries to prove 
 
on the one hand, that a born poet, etc., remains what he is from birth – namely 
a poet, etc..; and, on the other hand, that the born poet, etc., in so far as he 
becomes, develops, may “owing to unfavourable circumstances,” not become 
what he could become. His example, therefore, on the one hand, proves 
nothing at all and, on the other hand, proves the opposite of what it was 
intended to prove.43      
  
 Against a naïve belief in natural artistic genius and a negative view of the 
world as an obstacle to the becoming of natural artistic genius, Marx argues that the 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






world is the material context for artistic development, and the circumstances of the 
world, instead of being seen as either positive or negative apropos of the 
development of talent, should be seen as the basic conditions for the existence of all 
phenomena associated with arts and human creativity, including talent. This theory 
of talent is something that Marx explicates two years after The German Ideology, in 
The Poverty of Philosophy, his 1847 polemic against French socialism – as part of yet 
another of Marx’s Leftward politico-philosophical shifts, this time away from socialism 
and towards communism – where he approvingly quotes the 18th century Scottish 
economist Adam Smith’s view that perceived “‘differences in natural talents in 
different men’” are “the effect of the division of labour.’”44 But what precisely are the 
effects of material production on art? And what exactly is a theory of art as labour or 
productive human activity? The answer, I believe, can be found in Marx’s 
understanding of alienation, human nature, and the production of use-values, key 
themes of the writings of an older, mature Marx. 
 
Art as Produced Use-value 
 
It has been suggested that Marx’s break with Hegelianism, and the deep 
engagements with economic theory that characterise his latter work, mark a break 
with humanism. There is, as I shall suggest in the conclusion to this essay, indeed a 
potential for Marx’s theory of art to be extended in directions that are not grounded in 
human subjectivity; but I believe it to be a mistake to see Marx, even after his 
departure from Continental Europe and his seeking refuge from Prussian, French 
and Belgian authorities in the Victorian London, as an anti-humanist. There is no 
doubt that, from the publication of his and Engels’ most politically significant and 
inflammatory pamphlet The Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx would no longer 
directly or extensively engage with the Hegelians and their view of the arts and 
culture, but he would not go on to focus solely on the questions of class and 
economics and, by so doing, reduce human subjects to mere objects or data for 
economic analysis – as many a modern economist would be inclined to do – nor 
would he forgo his interest in the humanities.  
 Indeed, one of Marx’s most explicit reflections on the arts can be found in the 
unfinished manuscript Grundrisse, written in 1857-8, in the midst of Marx’s struggles 
with extreme poverty, family tragedy and the travails of revolutionary political 
activism and organisation in London. Here, an older and perhaps somewhat more 
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critical Marx, reiterates a point made more than a decade earlier apropos of the 
difference between the products of artistic production and those of non-artistic 
production, but he now firmly places the arts in the context of his increasingly 
elaborate theory of historical materialism. Putatively, he sets out to “clarify” and make 
“less puzzling” the paradoxical phenomenon of highly developed forms of artistic 
production (e.g. Homeric epics or Shakespearian drama) as found in rather 
“undeveloped” pre- or early-modern societies of ancient Greece and renaissance 
England.45 Marx then seems to try to resolve this contradiction – in a language that 
clearly recalls Aristotle’s Poetics – by suggesting that classical works of art can “still 
afford us artistic pleasure” – despite our modern capitalist socio-economic, 
technological and ideological conditions being vastly different to those of the early 
poets – because these works come from “the historic childhood of humanity;” and, in 
the same way that an adult may “find joy in the child’s naïveté,” a subject of the more 
historically and materially advanced society may find oneself under “the eternal 
charm” of the artistic products of “the unripe social conditions” of ancient Greece.46  
 Whilst I believe the above summary of Marx’s theory of art as put forward in 
the Grundrisse is accurate – and it clearly conforms to some of the commonly held 
views of Marx’s supposedly stageist and progressive theory of historical materialism 
– I must emphasise that it is an (intentionally) incomplete summary. What I have left 
out of my deceptive précis is Marx’s crucial discussion of artistic production, nestled 
between his proposal of the art’s paradoxical charm and his frankly unconvincing 
and ostensibly Romanic resolution of this paradox by resorting to the clichéd image 
of infantile innocence. It would surely not suffice to present a crass caricature of Marx 
– the most important theorist and organiser of working class political power in the 19th 
century, and one of the key historical champions of the indispensible force and 
integrity of work and production in the world – as a thinker who would only discuss 
the pleasurable or charming effect of art on future readers and consumers, without 
first emphasising the arts’ pivotal value as that which is produced by real people. 
 It is precisely such a frankly bizarre depiction of Marx – Marx as a theorist and 
advocate of bourgeois consumption, culture industries and commercialisation – 
which, I believe, has plagued so much of our understanding of Marx’s labour theory 
of value, and also of his approach to art. If value is nothing but that which is 
demanded and determined by a consumer or by the market, then Marx’s labour 
theory of value – which posits labour-time at the heart of a product qua an exchange-
value – can indeed be shown to be wrong, as has been argued by so many 
economists, political theorists and even Marxists since the publication of Capital, 
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since the prices of things in our world are clearly not the expression of the time or 
labour spent in producing them – as we all know, a simple ink sketch by a famous 
artist has much greater price or exchange-value than an entire life’s worth of 
sumptuous oil paintings by an unknown artist. But this irregularity or “the whole 
mystery of commodities”47 is precisely what Marx diagnoses, criticise and confronts in 
his critique of capitalist political economy. Marx is never less than emphatic about 
the complete value of work or of the product of work never being only an exchange-
value expressed in the universal equivalent form of money or in price; and that real 
people’s labour power and labour-time only become abstract (and, ultimately, 
hidden , distorted and minimised) for the purposes of surplus-value extraction, 
exploitation and commodification in accordance with the interests of the bourgeois 
ruling class – bosses, consumers, highly successful individuals such as famous 
artists, etc. – and against the interest of the ordinary workers and producers 
themselves. And I believe that such a misunderstanding of Marx and misreading of 
Capital is greatly assisted by what I’ve argued is a faulty belief in the mature Marx’s 
supposedly fundamental break with all the tropes of humanism found in his younger 
philosophy, including the crucial concept of alienation or estrangement. 
 Both terms alienation and estrangement have been used for translating the 
German words entäussern and entfremden as found in Marx’s writings, notably in the 
essay titled, posthumously, ‘Die Enfermdete Arbeit,’ (Engl. ‘Estranged/alienated 
Labour’) written during the younger Marx’s formative years in Paris, in 1844.  Here, in 
tandem with his gravitation towards communism, working class radicalism, Anglo-
Scottish economic theory and his growing awareness of the foundational albeit 
suppressed capacity of the worker in the modern world, Marx proposes that the 
bourgeoisie – employers, investors and financiers – make money and extract profit 
from workers and employees not through forced labour or the collection of feudal 
seigniorial dues, but via the less detectable but far more effective and modern 
method of commodification. When what the worker has produced (an object, a 
service, etc.) is removed from the worker’s immediate sphere of production and is 
entered into the market of consumer demands as something with a price, its value 
becomes subject to the law of supply and demand, as a result of which “the worker 
becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production 
increases in power and range.”48 And, hence, “the object which labour produces – 
labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the 
producer.”49    
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   Whilst earlier German Idealists had associated alienation with the basic 
premise of social existence – and with concomitant phenomena, such as dogmatic 
religious faith – Marx locates it in the specific milieu of the capitalist mode of 
production. And in order to explicate how precisely the capitalist appropriation of 
labour functions and results in deep and debilitating alienation – in which “man (the 
worker) no longer feels himself to be freely active”50 – Marx begins with a crucial 
definition of concrete or non-alienated human labour. Seen in the context of this 
definition, production is not primarily a professional or commercial activity, but what 
we as a species do due to our basic dependence on both organic nature (animals, 
plants, etc.) and inorganic nature (earth, water, air, etc.) for survival. As such, 
production is what we do to make the objects of nature useful for meeting our most 
immediate and pressing needs. Furthermore, we participate in this concrete and 
non-alienated production consciously and freely because, whilst engaged in 
satisfying our basic needs like animals, we are, unlike animals, aware of our actions 
and our needs, due to our universality or our cognitive ability to recognise ourselves 
as members of our species.  
It is in the course of making this perhaps complex definition of the origins of 
non-alienated production that Marx provides a highly pertinent and startling 
observation apropos of the work of art: 
 
The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the 
fact that man (like the animal) lives on inorganic nature; and the more 
universal man is compared with the animal, the more universal is the sphere 
of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, the air, 
light, etc., constitute a part of human consciousness in the realm of theory, 
partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art – his spiritual 
inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make it 
palatable and digestible – so too in the realm of practice they constitute a part 
of human life and human activity.51 
 
 A quick reading of this passage would suggest that Marx is merely advancing 
a somewhat more scientific version of Hegel’s belief in the spiritual value of art. But a 
closer analysis suggests something else entirely. Spirituality, according to Marx, is 
part of our inorganic nature, on par with other objects of inorganic nature (e.g. 
stones) which we, through practical productive activity (such as stone-cutting), turn 
into things that are useful to us (say, stone bricks). Spirituality is not in itself palatable 
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and digestible to us, and art is the task or process of the preparation and 
transformation of spirituality into something that we can use in the realm of theory. 
We may seek spiritual nourishment in the same way that non-universal organic 
beings (animals, plants, etc) would live on inorganic nature (drink water, breathe air, 
etc) but, as universal beings, we need to subject the inorganic objects of our non-
material or spiritual encounters with nature to a process of theoretical production in 
concert with our practical activities; and we satisfy this need for understanding, 
theorisation, ideation and, finally, assimilation or integration with the world – and, 
indeed, with nature – through practicing art (and, interestingly, also science.) The 
intrinsic value of art, therefore, results from art being the production of theoretical or 
intellectual usefulness or use-value out of the (non-scientific and non-artistic) 
spiritual interface between our human consciousness and the immediate non-
humanity of nature. 
 I don’t want to simplify this frankly extraordinary theory of art any more than is 
necessary for the purposes of clarification. But I would like to attempt, one more time, 
to put Marx’s view of art in as succinct a formulation as possible: art produces real, 
concrete human uses out of our spiritual, mythological and ideological 
environments, in the form of theories and ideas (or, as Plato might have it, truths) 
which enable us to comprehend, engage and integrate with the world. If both 
capitalism and organised religion produce alienation, then art has the power to de-
alienate, or make the world assimilable and familiar. And, importantly, this capacity is 
not brought about by the instrumentalisatin of art, but is the very raison d’être of art.  
 I would also like to emphasise that his view is not solely that of a humanist 
young Marx, but is one which is confirmed and elaborated upon by the mature, 
supposedly anti-humanist Marx during the apparently more scientific, less artistically 
focussed period of his latter work. In the Grundrisse, for example, in the passage 
which I neglected in my discussion of this work earlier in this essay, he notes that 
“Greek mythology is not only the arsenal of Greek art but also its foundation,”52 in 
precise agreement with his view from more than a decade earlier, which depicted 
spirituality as the basic inorganic condition upon which art is premised and from 
which art draws its material. He puts this point even more directly when 
distinguishing between the conscious – and universal – practices of Greek poetry 
and “Greek mythology, i.e. nature and social forms already reworked in an 
unconsciously artistic way by the popular imagination.”53 Mythology and spiritualty 
are different from each other, and the former can be seen as the more advanced 
stage of the latter, or mythology can be said to be spirituality subjected to popular 
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imagination and even aestheticised – and yet neither is an art but only art’s 
“material.”54  
 I maintain that Marx’s conclusion in the Grundrisse apropos of the paradox of 
art’s eternal charm remains unconvincing, not because I – as a practicing artist – 
have a personal aversion to accepting his conclusion that “the unripe social 
conditions [of highly mytho-spiritual milieus such as ancient Greece or Elizabethan 
England] under which [great flowerings of art] arose, and could alone arise, can 
never return.”55 If art is defined as mental or theoretical use-value produced from 
mythology and spirituality, then can’t it be said that art can continue to be produced 
out of the raw material of the myths or beliefs of the dominant bourgeois ideologies 
of our own modern capitalist world? It may be countered that the mature Marx had 
abandoned an interest in the theme of ideology altogether – in keeping with the 
thesis apropos of Marx’s break with humanism – but this is not plausible, since an 
ideological function, if not ideology per se, can be clearly discerned in the form of the 
“metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties”56 of commodity fetishism in the last 
major book of Marx’s to be published during his life, Capital, Volume 1.  
 Marx does not directly address the topic of art in Capital, Volume 1; but seeing 
as we have now defined his theory of art as one premised upon the production of 
inalienable, universal use-values, the influential and revealing depictions of use-value 
production – as opposed to fetishised, capitalist exchange-value accumulation – in 
his 1867 magnum opus may help with further elucidating the process and value of 
artistic production. In the very final section of the first part of the book, for example, 
he provides an account of forms of production different to capitalist commodification 
of labour-power, to highlight “all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the 
products of labour” under capitalism, as a result of which the exchange-value of a 
commodity is no longer rationally measured in accordance with the labour-time 
expended in the production of the commodity. The first of his examples is both from 
a work of literature and, I suggest, a demonstration of the kind of un-alienating use-
value entailed in the process of rational, non-magical artistic production: 
 
Since Robinson Crusoe’s experiences are a favourite theme with political 
economists, let us take a look at him on his island. Moderate though he be, yet 
some few wants he has to satisfy, and must therefore do a little useful work of 
various sorts, such as making tools and furniture, taming goats, fishing and 
hunting. Of his prayers and the like we take no account, since they are a 
source of pleasure to him, and he looks upon them as so much recreation. In 
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spite of the variety of his work, he knows that his labour, whatever its form, is 
but the activity of one and the same Robinson, and that it consists of nothing 
but different modes of human labour. Necessity itself compels him to 
apportion his time accurately between his different kinds of work. Whether one 
kind occupies a greater space in his general activity than another, depends on 
the difficulties, greater or less as the case may be, to be overcome in attaining 
the useful effect aimed at. […] All the relations between Robinson and the 
objects that [he has produced, which] form this wealth of his own creation are 
here so simple and clear as to be intelligible without exertion […] And yet those 
relations contain all that is essential to the determination of value.57   
 
 It would be tempting to read this passage as a dismissal of the labour value of 
art, since Robinson’s prayers and the like are not included alongside the laboured 
activities conducted for producing use-values. But, as I’ve already argued, the 
Marxian notion of art, despite depicting religion and spirituality (and ideology, more 
generally) as the raw material which artists work with and transform, does not preset 
art itself as prayers and the like. Indeed, there is a marked difference in the above 
passage between recreation and creation. The former, associated with spirituality 
and simple pleasures, may indeed not be seen as labour, and would therefore not 
have a labour value. But Marx clearly identifies creation as the very heart of 
productivity and material existence; and if, as I’ve argued throughout this essay à la 
Marx himself, artistic creation is a form of production (albeit of the mental and non-
physical kind) then it too may contribute towards the satisfaction of the subject’s few 
wants, produce useful effects and, finally, have determinable value.  
 
What Is to Be Done (About Art)? 
 
My methodology in writing this essay, and the basis for my analyses of Marx’s 
writings on art, has been to refer only to Marx’s own writings, and not to those of his 
many interpreters who have drawn on his writings to offer their own, at times highly 
pertinent, theories of art. This approach has been in keeping with my view that a 
fresh return to Marx’s own primary comments on art would obviate the imperative to 
account for, respond to and incessantly reaffirm or negate the assumptions and 
consequences of countless thinkers whose oeuvres constitute, directly or otherwise, 
a rather unwieldy and at times inconsistent system of thought referred to as Marxism. 
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That said, there is much that can be learnt from many of Marx’s followers, particularly 
if one were to expand a Marxian theory of art beyond the contours of what I have 
described as a theory of art qua produced use-value, for the purposes of 
constructing a poetics, or a framework that may be used for exploring modern and 
contemporary works of art, beyond, for example, Marx’s own personal interest in 
Greek poetry and Shakespeare. 
 Walter Benjamin’s 1934 paper ‘The Author as Producer,’ for example, provides 
an invaluable proposal for artistic operations – with concrete examples such as the 
epic theatre of Bertolt Brecht – which contribute directly towards improving artistic 
apparatuses or mediums in tandem with the communist drive for improving the life 
of the common person.58 Louis Althusser’s writings on art from the 1960s – such as 
‘Cremonini, Painter of the Abstract’ –illustrate how the work of art relates to and 
simultaneously distances itself from modern capitalist ideology, very much in 
keeping with Marx’s view apropos of art’s relationship with spirituality in earlier 
stages of historical development.59 And Alain Badiou’s 1998 book Handbook of 
Inaesthetics advances a detailed understanding of art as production in the Marxian 
realm of theory, as a condition with the capacity for offering immanent and singular 
truths in the finite form of the work of art, with the potential for a non-humanist 
Marxian theory of art.60 Highly influential to my own version of a Marxian theory of art 
in this essay has been the Soviet philosopher Mikhail Lifshitz’s The Philosophy of Art 
of Karl Marx (1933), which also advances its arguments by referring to Marx’s own 
writings.61 Whilst my selection of texts and interpretations are quite different to 
Lifishitz’s altogether more teleological or stageist – and in indeed, statist – version, I 
would not hesitate to acknowledge that my intention in writing this essay has been to 
revivify and provide for my own intellectual milieu something not so dissimilar to 
Lifshitz’s work in scope and purpose.  
 What I’ve written also differs to the abovementioned existing Marxian theories 
of art in that the starting point as well as the focus for my investigation has been the 
question of artistic value. It is, of course, not possible for me to presume what effects, 
if any, an explication of Marx’s belief in art’s inherent use-value may have on the 
contemporary discussions apropos of artistic value. One conclusion that can be 
drawn is that, despite what I find to be a rather understandable desire on the part of 
many contemporary artists to be paid and be paid fairly for their work – particularly in 
the context of the problem of the free movement of artistic content across electro-
digital media – there is very little in Marx’s thoughts that would automatically 
vindicate such a desire. As we have seen, for Marx art has an intrinsic labour value 
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which is radically opposed to the alienated-labour or exchange-value of a 
commodity. This does not mean that the products of artistic labour – or artistic 
labour-power itself – cannot at all be sold for a price, particularly if the artist him or 
herself is determined to be subjected to such a social relation; but in such a process 
the un-alienating value of art would disappear, and art would become commercially 
instrumentalised as a commodity such as entertainment (as Benjamin would have it) 
or be conceptually instrumentalised and be reified as culture (as Adorno or Badiou 
may have it). Despite the (frankly, remote) possibility for (elite) professionalised artists 
to develop working-class consciousness and even class subjectivity, it seems 
indisputable to me that, as Marx and Engels clearly and famously state in The 
Communist Manifesto, the “conversion” of “the poet” into “paid wage-labourer” is 
nothing other than an aim or outcome of the bourgeois domination of the world,62 
and I can’t see this conversion – or perhaps degradation – as anything other than 
something to be resisted by anyone with any affinity with Marx’s philosophy. 
 I am not suggesting that art does not take time and labour to produce, or that 
the artist does not require material sustenance. My conclusion, based on the 
exploration of Marx’s writings on art, is that art’s innate value, precisely as it is located 
in the course or at the time of its production – that is, as it is being created by the 
artist – is in itself a real and serious value of theoretical or mental productivity, 
producing in us the capacity to understand, familiarise ourselves with and perhaps in 
due course change our world and its beliefs and ideologies; and therefore it should 
not be lost or occulted in the field of our equally real and serious practical activities 
that are conducted for accruing the means for physical sustenance.  
 I have sought to show in this essay that Karl Marx, often narrowly seen as 
solely the theorist of wage-labourer class rights and politics, was not concerned only 
with those workers whose product of labour is produced in accordance with the 
commercial needs of modern capitalist economies (or the industrial working class); 
but also those workers, such as poets, whose labour, whilst not necessarily 
amenable to commodification and not produced industrially, produces true use-
values that might, in final consideration, provide a capacity for opposition and 
resistance to bourgeois capitalist ideology on par with – and not in spite of, and not 
in subordination to – the antagonism of waged workers and employees towards 
bourgeois capitalist economy. One must work and, when necessary, fight for one’s 
integrity and equality as a worker, both in satisfying material needs which, in our 
capitalist world – and until this world changes – demands that one sells some of 
one’s labour-power and labour-time to employers or consumers, and also, at the 
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same time, in satisfying one’s subjective and mental needs through allocating time 
and labour towards producing art for oneself, one’s loved ones, and one’s society. If 
such a state of existence seems unrealistic or even idealistic in our late capitalist 
world of overwork, underpayment, underemployment and unrestrained rises in the 
cost of living, then perhaps our inalienable demand to have time and the means to 
produce use-values as artists (alongside our demand to be renumerated fairly for the 
time we spend producing exchange-values for the bourgeoisie) will compel us 
towards a revolutionary break with capitalism. And if this demand does have a 
revolutionary potential, then it can be said – and I think Marx and even Plato may 
agree – that art also has a powerful, real and serious instrumental value. 
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